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As widely recognized, human mankind stands before the most challenging problem of preventing 
anthropogenic climate change. As a response to this, the European Union advocates an ambitious climate 
policy mix. However, there is no consensus concerning the impact of stringent environmental policy on 
firms’ competitiveness and profitability. From the traditional ‘static’ point of view there are productivity 
losses to be expected. On the other hand, the so called Porter hypothesis suggests the opposite; i.e., due to 
‘dynamic’ effects, ambitious climate and energy policies within the EU could actually be beneficial to firms 
in terms of enhanced profitability and competitiveness. Based on Sweden’s manufacturing industry, our 
main purpose is to specifically assess the impact of the CO2 tax scheme of Sweden on firms’ profit 
efficiency. The empirical methodology is based on stochastic frontier estimations and, in general, the 
results suggest we can neither reject nor confirm the Porter hypothesis across industry sectors. Therefore, 
we do not generally confirm the argument of stringent environmental policies having positive dynamic 
effects that potentially offset costs related to environmental policy. 
JEL-classification: D20, H23, Q52, Q55. 
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1. Introduction 
It is widely recognized that anthropogenic climate change is one of the most challenging and 
urgent global problems to be solved. For example, the European Union advocates an 
ambitious climate policy strategy to make a difference (see, e.g., EU, 2008), and in a 
worldwide perspective the EU has the intention of setting a good example. In particular, this 
has involved pursuing energy and climate policies that cut greenhouse gas emissions. For 
instance, a price on CO2 has been introduced by the EU Emission Trading System (ETS) in 
2005. The ETS will comprise all major carbon dioxide (CO2) emitting sectors, however, the 
sectors outside the ETS will not be exempted from climate and energy policy; for these non-
trading sectors, raised CO2 taxes is an alternative. In this respect, Sweden is a leading country 
as it was one of the first nations to introduce a CO2 tax for households and selected industry 
sectors in 1991. By international comparison, the CO2 tax in Sweden has been maintained at a 
significant level ever since.  
 
One common argument against environmental regulation is that they may, in addition to 
simply increase costs, hamper productivity and competitiveness among firms, and therefore 
further lower profits. Viewed in this perspective, high environmental ambitions of EU and 
Sweden may have far-reaching negative effects on regulated firms’ possibilities of competing 
on international markets. On the other hand, the well-known Porter hypothesis (Porter, 1991; 
Porter and van der Linde, 1995) claims that introducing, or strengthening, the ‘right kind’ of 
environmental regulation (e.g., in principle taxes and tradable permits) will induce 
productivity gains and reduce inefficiencies, leading to increased competitiveness and profits 
compared to countries with lower environmental ambitions. As a result environmental policy 
could be costless and, consequently, by being a ‘first mover’, the EU and Sweden could 
actually benefit more than they loose from its climate mitigation endeavors. Based on the case   2
of Sweden, this paper addresses this issue by studying the CO2 tax scheme and its effects on 
firms’ competitiveness and profits.  
 
The main purpose of this paper is to assess the contemporary and dynamic effects of the 
Swedish CO2 tax scheme on firm profit efficiency in the manufacturing industry during the 
period 1990 to 2004. The empirical approach consists of obtaining conditional profit 
efficiency scores by using a stochastic profit frontier approach. In this particular case we 
address efficiency in managing energy input use, i.e., we assume that firms may be more or 
less profit efficient depending on how well energy is managed in the production process. 
Efficiency is allowed to depend on both contemporary and lagged CO2 tax, which enables us 
to test for immediate and dynamic effects of CO2 taxation on profit efficiency.  
 
The literature on the Porter hypothesis and the argued effects of environmental regulation on 
profitability/competitiveness is now quite extensive. In a recent and comprehensive review, 
Brännlund and Lundgren (2009) conclude that there is no general evidence, neither for nor 
against the Porter hypothesis. It is also evident that there are few studies that directly address 
the profit perspective or even the ‘right kind’ of regulations. Also, as far as we know, there is 
no study that takes dynamics into account (lagged effects of the CO2 tax) when analyzing the 
relationship between climate policy, such as the Swedish CO2 tax, and firm profit efficiency. 
Therefore, this paper contributes importantly to the literature on the subject, which is made 
possible by a unique data set that includes total CO2 taxes actually paid at firm level in 
Swedish industry. If the Porter hypothesis is relevant in this case, an appealing policy 
implication is that firm productivity and competitiveness may be improved with relatively 
modest efforts (i.e. by simply raising the tax). Specifically, if profit inefficiency is confirmed, 
it means that individual firms’ actual profits are low in comparison to a potentially attainable   3
profit frontier. Hence, there are profit improvements to be made among these firms through 
better management of the energy input, without actally investing in any new technology; it is 
simply about using current technology and energy input resources more efficiently. If profit 
inefficiency is established, and if CO2 taxation has a significant positive effect on profit 
efficiency, then the CO2 tax schemes may constitute a policy that accomplishes both pollution 
reductions and profit improvements. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 the Porter hypothesis is described, and earlier 
literature on the subject is discussed. Section 3 presents the empirical framework; a stochastic 
frontier approach is used to estimate profit efficiency conditional on CO2 taxation. Section 4 
presents the data, and in Section 5 the empirical results are given. Finally, Section 6 offers a 
conclusion. 
 
2. Climate policy without cost?  
2.1 CO2 taxation in Swedish industry 
Regarding CO2 taxation in Sweden, a historical view and detailed discussion is provided in 
Brännlund (2009). Sweden was one of the first nations to introduce a CO2 tax for households 
and selected industry sectors in 1991. By international comparison, the CO2 tax has been 
maintained at a significant level ever since. However, the tax burden gradually shifted over to 
the non-industry sector over the years. In fact, the Swedish CO2 tax system is complex and 
characterized by exceptions and exemptions (see Brännlund, 2009). One argument for not 
imposing a too heavy burden on the industry sector is that the CO2 tax in Sweden cannot 
deviate too much from taxes in other countries, as it would jeopardize the competitiveness of 
Swedish firms on international markets. Nevertheless, the effective tax rate for industry firms   4
is not negligible; during the period 1991-2004 it was on average 0.11 SEK/kg CO2 (about 10 
EURO/ton) and it varied across years, sectors, and firms.   
 
The argument that the Swedish CO2 tax scheme should not deviate too much from tax policies 
in other countries contradicts the Porter hypothesis, which argues that environmental 
regulations of the ‘right kind’ lead to increased competitiveness. This hypothesis is discussed 
below. 
 
2.2 The Porter hypothesis  
A most widely used argument against stringent environmental regulation is that firms are 
forced to reduce production, or make certain investments that crowd out other more 
productive investments. Consequently, productivity levels and productivity growth are 
hampered, and therefore also competitiveness and profits. This means that environmental 
policy apprehends as causing the firms substantial costs. However, the Harvard Professor 
Michael E. Porter questioned these types of arguments (Porter, 1991). His arguments in favor 
of stringent environmental regulation of the ‘right kind’, such as pollution taxes, tradable 
permits, and deposit-refund schemes (Porter and van der Linde. 1995, p. 111), have later on 
become to be known as the Porter hypothesis. The hypothesis is in detail outlined in Porter 
and van der Linde (1995), where the most essential point made is that the relationship 
between environmental regulation and firm competitiveness should be viewed from a 
dynamic point of view and not from a static point of view. The dynamic view allows for firm 
adjustments over time that, e.g., incorporate process and technology development that is 
positive for firm performance. Hence, profit is increased, and is ultimately increased to such 
an extent that the cost of achieving the profit increase is offset. Accordingly, given that 
regulations have positive effects on the environment, the Porter hypothesis may be seen as a   5
“win-win” hypothesis. In other words, improved environmental status comes with seemingly 
no costs.  
 
The “win-win” outcome is sometimes referred to as a “strong” Porter effect. In Brännlund and 
Lundgren (2009, p. 9), a strong Porter effect is defined as originating from environmental 
policy-induced productivity gains that are generating additional profits that, at least, 
compensate for the costs of attaining the productivity gains. On the other hand, a “weak” 
Porter effect refers to the case when the cost is not fully compensated. In this paper we 
particularly address the Swedish climate policy and whether there are any effects on firm 
profit in general, strong or weak, in terms of affecting profit efficiency. Hereafter, the Porter 
hypothesis is formally considered from this perspective.  
 
According to Porter and van der Linde (1995), “win-win” situations arise because there are 
dynamic effects evolving over time. It is too narrow to regard effects of environmental policy 
from a static point of view. The static view of environmental taxation is illustrated in Figure 













Figure 1. Environmental taxation – Static effect on production. 
  
Assume that a profit-maximizing firm produces a market product,  y , by using a single input 
factor, x. The product and factor price is  p  and w, respectively. Then the firm profit 
objective to be maximized is  wx py − = ∏0 . Furthermore, assume that the use of input give 
rise to emissions of some pollutant according to  z x = α ,  0 > α . Accordingly, firm production 
may be described as  ) ( 0 z f y = . Given the relative price,  p w , i.e., the slope of the price line, 
0 ∏ , the profit maximizing firm will produce the amount  0 y , when not being environmentally 
regulated.  Consequently, the production will generate the emission level  0 z .  
 
Next, assume that the regulating authority imposes an unit tax on emissions, τ , which means 
that the production cost increases to   x w ) ( τ + , or  α τ z w ) ( + . Given the technology in use, 
) ( 0 z f , the profit maximizing firm adjusts as reflected by the altered slope of the price line 
from  p w  to  p w / ) ( τ + . This will reduce the emission level to  τ z , as desired by the   7
authority, but also will the production level be lowered to  τ y . Consequently, the firm profit 
decreases from  0 ∏  to  τ ∏  due to environmental taxation.  This is a static view of tax effects 
on firm performance. 
 
However, as argued by the Porter hypothesis, there are circumstances that allow for 
environmental regulations of the ‘right kind’, e.g., a tax, to increase profits. Such a 
circumstance is, e.g., when resource inefficiencies are present pre-taxation, or when tax rates 
are low (Porter and van der Linde, 1995, p. 99). To illustrate the Porter hypothesis and 
accounting for variation in resource efficiency, we therefore start out from the literature of 
productive efficiency.
2 This allows us to view firm performance development by considering 
not only technological change, but also efficiency change. This is illustrated in Figure 2, 
where the firm due to management inefficiency is operating at point C, and is obviously not 



















Figure 2. Environmental taxation – Dynamic Porter effect on production. 
                                                 
2 See, e.g., Coelli et al., (2005), Färe and Primont (1995), and Fried et al. (2008).   8
 
Again, assume that the regulatory authority imposes an emission tax, τ . Then, according to 
the Porter hypothesis, the tax burden will make the firm aware of inefficiencies and, hence, 
the firm will begin to use each input unit more efficiently to maximize profit. Before the tax is 
imposed, improved efficiency in line with profit maximization would be illustrated by the 
firm moving its operation from point C to point A. However, as the imposed tax changes the 
relative price between the produced market product and emissions, the firm adjusts further to 
point B. Compared to operating at point C the production is increased from  0 y  to  τ y , at the 
same time as emissions are reduced from  0 z  to  τ z . Obviously, if a firm is operating 
inefficiently when not being environmentally regulated, imposing a tax will not only cause the 
firm costs, but also may induce additional revenues. Therefore, it is not obvious that imposing 
an emission tax will reduce the firm profit. As illustrated in Figure 2, and as the Porter 
hypothesis suggests, profit increases from  0 ∏  to  τ ∏  (which is the opposite compared to the 
case illustrated in Figure 1).
3  
 
However, taking a traditional standpoint, the positive effect on firm profit from moving from 
point C to point B would not be regarded as a dynamic effect of environmental taxation, as no 
technological change actually has occurred from one period to another. But, this particular 
movement does not necessarily have to occur instantaneously. Firms may adjust stepwise 
during several periods after the tax having been imposed. Hence, efficiency may improve over 
time. As such taxes may be regarded as having dynamic effects on firm efficiency.  
 
Finally, technological change is manifested by shifts in the frontier technology, which may be 
seen as results of environmental taxation stimulating innovative behavior that leads to 
                                                 
3 However, whether profits actually increase due to firms being environmentally taxed is entirely a task for 
empirical research.   9
development of new processes. In Figure 2, this is illustrated by the technology shift from 
) ( 0 z f y =  to  ) (z f y τ = . Given the relative price  p w / ) ( τ + , the profit maximizing firm will 
then operate at point D. Production increases further to  1 y , emissions are reduced further to 
1 z  and, accordingly, the profit increases to  1 ∏ .  
 
In this paper we analyze the Porter hypothesis by investigating whether there is a positive 
relationship between CO2 taxation and profit efficiency, which in Figure 2 is illustrated by the 
distance between C and B.  
 
2.3 Earlier literature 
A recent review by Brännlund and Lundgren (2009) structures the international literature and 
put things into perspective. Their main conclusion is that there is no general empirical 
evidence in favor of the Porter hypothesis, but neither is there any general evidence against 
the hypothesis. However, empirical research specifically focusing on the effects of 
environmental policy on productivity growth tends to show either negative effects or no 
effects at all. Furthermore, regarding studies on environmental policy and effects on firm 
profits, a study that somewhat distinguishes from the others, in terms of model approach 
adopted, is Brännlund and Lundgren (2010). Using a factor demand system, they study the 
effects of the Swedish CO2 tax regime on technological progress and profit development in 
the Swedish manufacturing industry, corresponding to a shift in the price line from  τ ∏  to  1 ∏  
in Figure 2. The results show a ‘reversed’ Porter effect, specifically for energy intensive 
industries. The present study uses partly the same data set but from a different perspective; we 
look specifically on both the contemporary and dynamic effects of a CO2 tax on profit 
(in)efficiency, i.e., a shift from  0 ∏  to  τ ∏ .  
   10
Important to notice is that the empirical studies directing the Porter hypothesis are in general 
missing the most crucial argument of the hypothesis, namely the dynamic perspective. 
Managi et al. (2005) and Lanoie et al. (2008) are, however, two studies that consider 
dynamics in some sense. Studying the oil and gas production in the Gulf of Mexico, at the 
field level, during a 28-year period, Managi et al. (2005) first apply Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) to measure various components of Malmquist output-oriented Total Factor 
Productivity (TFP). In a second step they apply econometrics to test the Porter hypothesis. 
This involves allowing for dynamic effects of environmental stringency by incorporating lag 
structures. Environmental stringency is proxied by the cost of complying with environmental 
regulations. Their results show no significant relationship between environmental stringency 
and productivity change, or technological change (which could be exemplified by the 
movement from point B to point D in Figure 2), when only modeling market output 
(excluding bad outputs). However, whether this is to be interpreted as being non-supportive to 
the standard Porter hypothesis on market outputs is less clear as it, by Managi et al. (2005), 
appears that environmental regulations imposed on offshore oil and gas production have 
historically been in terms of command-and-control. Generally, Porter and van der Linde 




Performing an empirical analysis on 17 Quebec manufacturing sectors during 1985-1994, 
Lanoie et al. (2008) first calculate a Törnquist TFP-index and in a second step TFP is 
regressed on a set of explanatory variables, e.g., environmental stringency. As a proxy for 
environmental stringency investment in pollution-control is used. Furthermore, to test for 
dynamic effects the pollution-control investment variable is lagged. Their results show that 
                                                 
4According to Porter and van der Linde (1995, p. 110, Footnote 13), command-and-control should be seen as a 
last resort.    11
there are positive dynamic effects on TFP (which could be exemplified by the movement 
from point B to point D in Figure 2). However, whether this is to be interpreted as being in 
favor of the Porter hypothesis is doubtful. The pollution-control variable used as a proxy for 
environmental regulation stringency mainly incorporate “end-of-pipe” equipment, which 
Porter and van der Linde (1995, p. 111) not really recommend.  
 
A similar approach, and accounting for dynamics, is adopted in Broberg et al. (2010). They 
study the effect of environmental protection investments on total firm efficiency in five 
Swedish manufacturing sectors during the period 1999-2004.
5,6, Total efficiency scores are 
first estimated using a parametric stochastic frontier production function approach. Then, in a 
second step, the efficiency scores are used as the dependent variable in linear random effects 
regression analyzes, where investment in pollution control and pollution prevention, together 
with some control variables, are included as independent variables. Investment in pollution 
prevention is clearly recommended by Porter and van der Linde (1995). However, the results 
in Broberg et al. (2010) show no general support for the Porter hypothesis and argued 
dynamic effects of environmental regulation on productivity.  
 
Finally, it is obvious that there are only a few studies on the Porter hypothesis that directs 
environmental policy and its effects on firm profit, and also account for dynamics. 
Additionally, to our best knowledge, there is no study on effects of environmental regulation 
on profit efficiency (referring to price line shift from  0 ∏  to  τ ∏  in Figure 2). In this paper 
such a study is provided, which is, similarly to the Broberg et al. (2010) study, based on a 
stochastic frontier approach. This is the topic of the next section. 
                                                 
5 The components of total efficiency are technical efficiency and management efficiency. The effects on 
technical and management efficiency are not isolated. 
6 The sectors are Wood and wood products, Pulp and paper, Chemicals, Rubber and plastic, and Basic metals.   12
3. Stochastic frontier analysis 
To test whether the CO2 tax regime in Sweden has had any effects on firms’ profit efficiency 
we use stochastic frontier analysis,
7 which was suggested by Battese and Coelli, (1992, 1995), 
and Coelli (1996). Furthermore, the estimating procedure may be seen as being composed of 
two parts performed in chorus. The first part refers to obtaining profit efficiency scores by 
estimating stochastic profit functions. The second part refers to the actual tests, where the 
profit efficiency scores are dependent on a CO2 tax variable and a set of control variables. In 
purpose of catching dynamic effects of CO2 taxation, the tax variable is also lagged, following 
Managi et al. (2005) and Lanoie et al. (2008). As suggested in Battese and Coelli (1995), the 
two parts of the estimating procedure are conducted simultaneously. Recent studies using the 
simultaneous approach, however estimating production functions and not profit functions, are, 
e.g., van der Vlist et al. (2007), and Shadbegian and Gray (2006).  
 
3.1 Theoretical outline 
The production function approach is commonly used when estimating frontiers; however, 
here we instead base our analysis on a stochastic frontier profit function approach. When 
estimating production functions directly, there are some econometrical issues (Kumbhakar, 
2001). For instance, as firms choose input quantities in production in purpose of maximizing 
profits, the assumption of regressors being exogenously given is violated. This will lead to 
inconsistent parameter and technical efficiency estimates. However, this problem is avoided 
when estimating profit functions as output and input prices are (assumed) exogenous to the 
firm’s optimizing problem. 
 
                                                 
7 For an introduction and a general discussion of stochastic frontier estimations, see, e.g., Coelli et al. (2005), or 
Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000).   13
The profit efficiency approach adopted is based on Kumbhakar (2001), and may be described 
as follows. First, the underlying production function may be expressed as  
 
()
u e x f y
− = ,   0 ≥ u , 1 0 ≤ <
−u e         ( 1 )  
 
where  y  is produced market output, x is a vector of inputs used in production, and u  is 
technical efficiency. Technical efficiency is in this case referred to as being output-oriented, 
i.e., it says something about how much output can be increased, holding input quantities 
constant.  
 
Assuming that technical inefficiency exists, i.e.,  0 > u , the profit function corresponding to 
equation (1) may be written as 
 
() ( )
u pe w u p w
− = , , , π π           ( 2 )  
 
which hereafter is named as the observed profit function. As 
u e
−  introduces profit 
inefficiency into the model, the expression in equation (2) may be rewritten as 
 
( ) () ( ) u p w h p w pe w
u , , , , ⋅ =
− π π          ( 3 )  
 
where  ) , ( p w π  is the maximized profit function and  ) , , ( u p w h  is profit efficiency. By 
assuming the underlying production function,  ) (x f , being homogenous of degree r , profit 
efficiency is assumed to not depend on prices,  ) , ( p w , but only on output-oriented technical 















           ( 4 )  
 
where the maximized profit function constitute the profit frontier. Hence, profit inefficiency 
indicates that there is profit loss attributed to output technical inefficiency, and it is interpreted 
in terms of percentage loss. Only if  0 = u  profit efficiency is  1 ) ( = u h . 
 
Based on frontier production function estimations, as suggested by Battese and Coelli (1992, 
1995), and Coelli (1996), the stochastic profit frontier model may be expressed as 
 
( ) ( ) ()
π β π kt kt kt
u
kt u v g n pe w n − + =
− A A ,        ( 5 )  
 
where ) (⋅ kt π  is the observed profit of firm k  in year t, and   ] ,..., , ,..., [
1 1 N M
kt w w p p g =  is a 
vector of output and input prices. The error term is divided into two components  kt v  and 
π
kt u . 
The component  kt v  arises from random chocks and measurement errors, and these influences 
are ) , 0 (
2
v N iid σ  and independent of 
π
kt u , which is a nonnegative random variable that 
captures profit inefficiency, and is independently (not identically) distributed such that it is 
obtained by truncation at zero of  ) , (
2
u kt z N σ δ . Finally, 
2
v σ  and 
2
u σ  are replaced with 
2 2 2
u v σ σ σ + =  and  ) (
2 2 2
u v u σ σ σ γ + = .
8 
 
In all, the profit inefficiency in equation (4) is defined as 
 
                                                 
8 To test whether there is any profit inefficiency at all a significance test of the γ  estimate can be run (see 
Coelli, 1996, p. 6).   15
kt kt kt z u υ δ
π + =           ( 6 )  
 
where  kt z  is a vector of variables that are exogenously given to the firms’ production 
processes, and δ  is a vector of parameters to be estimated. The random variable,  kt υ  ~  
) , 0 (
2
υ σ N , is truncated by the variable truncation point 
π υ δ kt kt kt u z − = −  (see equation (6)).  
 
Profit efficiency is then defined as 
 
() ( ) exp exp kt kt kt kt PE u z
π δ υ =− =− − ,          ( 7 )  
 
which shows that the smaller the nonnegative inefficiency variable, 
π
kt u , the more profit 
efficient is firm k . Hence, when  0 =
π
kt u then 1 = kt PE  and the firm is operating efficiently on 
the profit frontier. 
 
The expressions in equation (6) and (7) constitute the basis of the test procedures to be 
conducted in this paper. 
   16
3.2 Empirical approach 
3.2.1 The profit frontier 
The empirical approach taken includes the specification of the profit function in equation (5), 
which is parameterized as a Cobb-Douglas log function specification.
9 It is assumed that the 
firms are producing one market product by using the input factors capital (K), labor (L), 
electricity (E), and fossil fuel (F). In purpose of focusing on technical efficiency related to 
energy inputs, the profit function is specified as a restricted profit function. This means that 
capital and labor are modeled as being fixed in the short run. Furthermore, the function is 
normalized in terms of the output price in purpose of imposing the property of being 
homogenous in prices. Hence, the stochastic restricted normalized profit function is specified 
and estimated on the capital and labor input factors, K and L, on prices of energy input 
factors,  E w ,  F w , and the price of the produced product,  p , as follows:
10  
 
























n L n K n
− +
+ + + + + + = ∑
−
=




0 A A A A
 
 
where the normalization imposes the parameter restriction  1 = + + P F E α α α . The function is 
convex and continuous in prices, non-decreasing in  p and non-increasing in w, and concave 
and continuous in fixed input factors  (Bergman, 1997).
11 The estimated parameters of the 
fixed factors are therefore expected to have a positive sign. Furthermore, to account for size 
                                                 
9 More flexible profit function specifications were tested, such as the translog, but the Cobb-Douglas performed 
better in terms of model convergence and economically reasonable parameter estimates. 
10 In the case of a underlying Cobb-Douglas production function that is homogeneous, the relationship between 
profit efficiency and output technical efficiency may be expressed as  u r u p w nh ⋅ − = ) 1 ( 1 ) , , ( A , where r is 
the degree of homogeneity. The difference between profit efficiency and output technical efficiency is then 
defined as a scale effect (Kumbhakar, 2001, footnote 9, p. 5). 
11 See Chand and Kaul (1986) for a discussion of the restricted normalized Cobb-Douglas profit function.    17
effects on profit, size dummies, 
q
size D , are included. For this purpose, firms are divided into 
size quartiles,  4 ,..., 1 = q , based on number of employees. This will introduce size specific 
profit frontiers, which via the intercept differ in levels. That is, all firms belonging to a certain 
size is compared to the same frontier level. Finally, technological development is modeled as 
being Hicks neutral by  ) (t f τ α , for  T t ,..., 1 = periods. Specifically, technological 




2 1 ) ( t t t t f τ τ τ α α α + + = . 
 
3.2.2 The profit efficiency model 
The main purpose of this paper is to test whether the CO2 tax regime in Sweden has had any 
effects on firms’ profit efficiency. Therefore, the expression in equation (7) also needs to be 
explicitly specified, meaning that relevant explanatory  kt z  variables need to be identified. 
Specifically, the empirical profit efficiency effects model reads as follows: 
 
01 2 2 2 , 3 () () kt kt k lag kt t kt u tax CO tax CO Size Trend δ δδ δ δ υ −=+ + + + +     (9) 
 
which, following Battese and Coelli (1992, 1995), and Coelli (1996), is estimated 
simultaneously with equation (8). The explanatory variables are the following;  kt CO tax ) 2 ( 
captures the contemporaneous (static) effect of the CO2 tax on profit efficiency, and 
lag k CO tax , ) 2 (  captures the dynamic effects. The latter variable is constructed as a moving 
average of a three lag structure, i.e., tax(CO2)k,lag = (tax(CO2)kt-1+ tax(CO2)kt-2+ tax(CO2)kt-3)
 
/3. Furthermore, “Size” is a variable that accounts for size effects within each size quartile and 
is a function of labor stock. Finally, a trend variable is included to account for time effects on 
profit efficiency, e.g., booms, recessions, and other time specific events that are not related to   18
Hicks neutral technological development in the profit function. The parameters to be 
estimated are  3 2 1 0 , , , δ δ δ δ , and  t δ . T-tests on the estimated parameters of contemporaneous 
and dynamic effects of CO2 taxation,  1 ˆ δ  and  2 ˆ δ , respectively, are then performed in order to 
evaluate the validity of the Porter hypothesis. Based on the hypothesis suggesting that there 
are positive dynamic effects of environmental regulation on profits, the  2 ˆ δ  estimate is 
expected to take a positive sign. On the other hand, the  1 ˆ δ  estimate is to be viewed as 
capturing static effects of CO2 taxation, and Porter and van der Linde (1995) see the 
traditional neoclassical view on environmental regulation as being static and too narrow. 
Therefore, it seems natural to not exclude the possibility of a negative sign for  1 ˆ δ .  
 
3.2.3 An alternative approach 
The empirical model outlined above follows a quite common procedure concerning how 
quasi-fixed variables are entered into the model. That is, in our case, quasi-fixed capital (K) 
and Labor (L) are modeled as arguments in the profit function (equation (8)). However, an 
alternative approach would be to include these variables as arguments in the inefficiency 
function (equation (9)). As brought forward by Lovell (1993, p. 53) it is not always obvious 
what variables belong to the first stage of the estimating procedure, i.e., equation (8), and 
what variables belong in the second stage, i.e., equation (9). He suggest, amongst others, that 
fixed variables are to be regarded as variables that explain the distribution of the 
(in)efficiency scores. Hence, we also present results from estimations where the capital (K) 
and labor (L) variables are included as arguments in equation (9), instead of in equation (8). 
These slightly different approaches will also provide us with a robustness test of the estimates.   19
4. Data 
Table 1 provides an overview of the different sectors in the data set available. The data 
contains information from all firms in the manufacturing industry in Sweden (SNI10-37). 
 
Table 1. Swedish manufacturing industry data. 
SNI (branch code)  Description 
10, 11, 131-132, 14  Mining  
15-16 Food   
17-19 Textile 
201-205 Wood 
2111-2112, 2121-2124  Pulp and paper 
22 Printing   
231-233, 24  Chemical  
251-252  Rubber and plastic  
261-268  Stone and mineral  
27-28  Iron and steel 
29 Machinery 
30-33 Electro 
34 Motor  vehicles 
Notes: Industry branch code classification of Swedish manufacturing (SNI) according to 
Statistics Sweden.  
The data set is a firm level balanced panel covering the years 1990 to 2004.
12 It contains firms 
with more than five employees and includes data on output (sales), value added, input data on 
(quantities and values) labor, electricity and fuels, and gross investment (machinery and 
buildings). Capital stocks are calculated residually from other data available; value added, 
                                                 
12 Brännlund and Lundgren (2010) use an unbalanced panel containing data on the same variables and from same 
sectors as in the present study. The balanced panel used here is a sub-set of their data set which contains all firms 
that have ’survived’  the whole period, 1990-2004.   20
cost of capital, and salary paid to employees.
13 Assuming that value added is compensation to 
labor and capital (salaries plus capital costs), we can extract the capital stock residually. The 
data also contains detailed information on emissions of CO2 and total payment of CO2 tax for 
each firm. This enables us to construct a variable for “effective” CO2 tax, which varies 
considerably across firms, sectors, and over time. 
Output price indices
14 are sector specific, and firm specific input prices can be calculated 
from the costs for labor, electricity, and fuels. The calculation of the price of capital is based 
on national and industry based indices, respectively, which seems plausible considering that 
firms have limited opportunities to affect the prices for capital (global market) significantly. 
Some descriptive can be found in Table 2 and Figure 3. As mentioned above, the CO2 tax 
varies considerably across sectors ranging from about 0.04 SEK/kg in the wood product 
sector to almost 0.15 SEK/kg in the Food sector. From Figure 3 it is evident that there is no 
particular pattern or relationship between the cost shares of energy or fuels and the actual CO2 
tax paid by firms. In other words, high use of CO2 emitting inputs does not necessarily mean 
that the payments of CO2 tax per unit emitted are also high. 
 
                                                 
13 Assuming that value added is VA = pLL + pKK, i.e., compensation to primary factors of production. 
14 Collected from Statistics Sweden, see producer price index section at the website www.scb.se.   21
Table 2. Descriptive statistics. Mean values 1990-2004. 
 
Sector 
Variable  Mining Food Textile  Wood  Pulp/paper  Printing




































































Nobs 193  2037  399  1800  1285  945 




Table 2. Continuing 
Sector 














































































Nobs 974  917  1042  2753  3649  1098 












Figure 3. Input cost share for energy and fossil fuels, and CO2 tax (SEK/Kwh) 
 
5. Results 
The results presented in this section counts for the Swedish manufacturing sector as a whole, 
the energy intensive sector, and the non-energy intensive sector. Estimations are also run on 
individual sectors separately (full estimation results are given in Appendix A). Two slightly 
different estimating approaches are behind the results. In Table 3a the results are based on 
modeling the quasi-fixed capital and labor variables as arguments in the profit function, i.e., 
equation (8), and in Table 3b the results are based on modeling these variables as arguments 
in the (in)efficiency function, i.e., equation (9). As the γ -columns reveal, independently of 
estimating approach, significant profit inefficiencies can be established for all sectors, except 
for Steel/Iron.    23























Manufacturing -*** -***  0.664  0.522***  0.401  Yes/no  13100 
Energy int.  -***  -***  0.671  0.536***  0.479  Yes   7338 
Non-energy int.  +*  +  0.716  0.605***  0.267  No  5762 
Mining +  +**  0.599  0.864***  0.265  Yes  141 
Food -  +*  0.269  0.864***  0.412  Yes  1493 
Textile +  +**  0.492  0.837***  0.254  No  277 
Wood -  -  0.568  0.964***  1.372  Yes  1298 
Pulp/Paper -**  -  0.635  0.561***  0.177  Yes  949 
Printing -  +*  0.660  0.551***  0.249  No  637 
Chemical -  -  0.633  0.339***  0.651  Yes  689 
Rubber/Plastic -  -  0.796  0.492**  0.182  No 644 
Mineral/Stone +  -* 0.749  0.480***  0.278  Yes  744 
Steel/Iron     0.906  0.002  0.392  Yes  2030 
Machine/Electro +  -*  0.697  0.656***  0.263 No  2552 
Motor vehicles  +***  -***  0.696  0.702***  0.215  No  1048 
*Significant at 10% level. **Significant at 5% level. ***Significant at 1% level. 
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Manufacturing -***  -  0.583  0.575***  0.616  Yes/no  13217 
Energy int.  -***  -***  0.150  0.228***  0.562  Yes   7406 
Non-energy int.  +*  +  0.076  0.021***  0.362  No  5811 
Mining +  -  0.664  0.590***  0.335  Yes  141 
Food -  +  0.618  0.594***  0.652  Yes  1503 
Textile -  +***  0.297  0.836***  0.192  No  277 
Wood -**  -  0.620  0.654***  0.648  Yes  1301 
Pulp/Paper -**  -**  0.290  0.863***  0.199  Yes  951 
Printing +  +  0.717  0.498***  0.353  No  639 
Chemical +  +**  0.476  0.481***  0.568  Yes  620 
Rubber/Plastic + -*** 0.641  0.657***  0.306  No 642 
Mineral/Stone +***  -*  0.587  0.359**  0.255  Yes  787 
Steel/Iron     0.076  0.000  0.412  Yes  2038 
Machine/Electro -  -  0.635  0.623***  0.440 No  2554 
Motor vehicles  +*  -*  0.657  0.536***  0.468  No  821 
 
 
Regarding estimated efficiency scores, the values vary considerably in levels, and between 
sectors. When modeling capital and labor as arguments in the profit function, Table 3a, the 
estimated average efficiency scores vary between individual sectors from 0.269 for Food to 
0.796 for Rubber/Plastic. The corresponding figures with capital and labor as arguments in the 
(in)efficiency function, Table 3b, are 0.290 for Pulp and paper and 0.717 for printing. The 
interpretation is that the capacity of output production exceeded actual production during 
1991-2004. The second approach which models capital and labor as arguments in the 
(in)efficiency function, as suggested by Lovell (1993), seem to work less well. For instance,   25
the efficiency scores for the whole manufacturing sector, energy intensive sector, and non-
energy intensive sector are 0.575, 0.150, and 0.076, respectively. The efficiency scores are 
unreasonable low for the energy intensive and non-energy intensive sectors compared to the 
manufacturing sector as a whole. Instead, as indicated in Table 3a, one should expect 
efficiency scores not to vary considerably on higher aggregation levels.
15 Therefore, hereafter 
we comment only on the results generated by the model where capital and labor variables are 
included as arguments in the profit function.
16  
 
The results indicate in general that manufacturing firms did not make efficient use of their 
technologies during the period in study and, therefore, did not maximize profits. The question 
is then whether the CO2 tax scheme, introduced 1991, contributed positively to profit 
(in)efficiency during the period we study. For the manufacturing sector as a whole the result 
is very clear. The CO2 tax had both negative static effects and negative dynamic effects on 
firm profit efficiency. This result contradicts the Porter hypothesis. Divided into subsectors, 
this conclusion still holds for the energy intensive sector. For the non-energy intensive sector, 
however, the result is in line with the Porter hypothesis, indicating that CO2 taxation have 
positive effects on efficiency. Only the static effect is significant on the 10 percent level. 
 
Turning to analyzing individual sectors, the results prove to vary substantially. Among the 
sectors Wood, Chemical, and Rubber/Plastic the CO2 taxation did not have any effect on 
profit efficiency what so ever. A Porter effect appears among the sectors Mining, Food, 
Textile, and Printing. In these cases we identify positive dynamic effects of CO2 taxation on 
profit efficiency. Notable is that when looking specifically on disaggregated data estimations 
                                                 
15The manufacturing sector is simply divided into energy intensive and non-energy intensive firms. This suggests 
that estimation of inefficiencies based on the sub-samples (energy intensive and non-energy intensive) should 
not differ so much from the estimated inefficiency based on the whole manufacturing sector. 
16 However, note that the results of both models, provided in Tables 3a and 3b, indicate similar static and 
dynamic effects of CO2 taxation on profit efficiency.   26
(sectors), energy intensity of production seems to make little difference; Mining and Food 
being energy intensive, and Textile and Printing not being energy intensive. Interestingly, 
from the data section it is clear that the average tax paid by these four sectors was 0.101 
SEK/kg emitted CO2, which is slightly lower than the average of 0.11SEK/kg for all 12 
sectors in study. There is no clear link between the level of average tax paid in a sector and 
the rejection or acceptance of the Porter argument.  
 
In sum; the results are similar to those often achieved in previous studies. It is difficult to 
confirm any general effect of environmental regulation on productivity, in our case 
specifically profit efficiency. Therefore, the results provide no general evidence either for or 
against the Porter hypothesis. Instead, the results vary between sectors and aggregation levels.  
 
6. Discussion and conclusions 
The European Union advocates an ambitious climate policy strategy to address the 
anthropogenic climate change, and in a worldwide perspective the EU has the intention of 
setting a good example. According to the Porter hypothesis, the EU would benefit from such a 
strategy of being a ‘first-mover’ by applying the ‘right kind’ of environmental regulations. 
The hypothesis is controversial in some circles, and has been a subject of intensive research 
within the field of economics since the mid nineties. However, there are quite few studies that 
directly address the right kind of regulations, e.g., pollution taxes and tradable permits, and 
also address the effects of such regulations on firm profits. Furthermore, as far as we know, 
no study has concerned dynamic effects of CO2 taxation on firms’ profit efficiency before. In 
general, even though the dynamic perspective is the central message of the Porter hypothesis, 
it is very much left out in previous studies.  
   27
Considering the ‘first mover’ strategy of the EU, the main purpose of this paper has mainly 
been to assess the dynamic effects of the Swedish CO2 tax scheme on firm profit efficiency in 
manufacturing during the period 1990 to 2004. The task has been accomplished by using a 
stochastic frontier approach.  
 
The results are similar to those often presented in previous studies. It is difficult to confirm 
any general effect of environmental regulation on productivity, in our case specifically CO2 
taxation on firms’ profit efficiency. Therefore, the results provide no general evidence, neither 
for nor against the Porter hypothesis. On aggregated levels, manufacturing as a whole and the 
energy intensive sector show now positive response to taxation, while in the non-energy 
intensive sector results are less conclusive. Furthermore, the results vary between sub-sectors, 
and the estimations indicate positive dynamic effects within the Mining, Food, Textile, and 
Printing sectors.  
 
 Compared to other studies directing dynamic effects of environmental regulation on 
productivity, the results in this study is similar to those in Broberg et al. (2010). They find no 
general effect of investment in environmental protection on technical efficiency. However, the 
results differ from those in Lanoie et al. (2008). They find that investments in pollution 
control have positive dynamic effects on technological change in Quebec manufacturing in 
Canada. Also, they find that the positive dynamic effects are stronger in sectors which are 
more exposed to international competition. However, we do not confirm the latter finding. 
Our results indicate positive dynamic effects of CO2 taxation on profit efficiency within four 
Swedish manufacturing sectors. Three of them are the same sectors as those in Quebec   28
manufacturing that Lanoie et al. (2005) identify as less exposed to international competition, 
i.e., Food, Textile, and Printing.
17  
 
Furthermore, our study can be seen as a complement to Brännlund and Lundgren (2009). 
Using a sub-set of their data, the picture of the impact of CO2 taxation on productivity in 
Swedish manufacturing is broadened. For energy intensive industries, due to negative effects 
on technological change, Brännlund and Lundgren (2009) find a negative impact of CO2 
taxation on profits. Taken together, no positive clear cut confirmation of the Porter hypothesis 
can be made regarding CO2 taxation and its impact on profits. 
 
The final and overall conclusion that can be made from this study is that we cannot confirm 
the hypothesis that the EU, or individual Member States, would benefit from being a ‘first 
mover’ in terms of imposing high CO2 tax rates compared to other countries outside EU. 
 
There are some interesting topics of future research. For instance, the EU attaches great 
importance to tradable permits by its Emission Trading System (ETS). The literature on 
environmental regulation and its impact on firm performance, in terms of giving incentives to 
productivity growth, is extensive but leaves out tradable permits. Another interesting topic 
would be to assess actual environmental performance on firm productivity and 
competitiveness. Simultaneously estimating the effect of CO2 taxation on emission intensity 
and the effect of emission intensity on productivity would give an efficient estimate of the 
effect of environmental performance on productivity. 
                                                 
17 Lanoie et al. (2005, p. 123) measures international competition as: exports + imports / total shipments. They 
find that the manufacturing sectors in Quebec, Canada, most exposed to international competition are Leather, 
Paper and allied products, Primary metals, Machinery, Transportation equipment, Electrical and electronic 
products, and Chemicals   29
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Appendix A  
Table A1. Results with K and L in ”main” profit function as fixed inputs 
 
Manufacturing      Energy intensive industry   
Parameter Estimate  Error  t-statistic  P-value  Parameter Estimate  Error  t-statistic  P-value
A0 5.482  0.109  50.327  [.000]   A0  6.253  0.116  54.085  [.000]
A1 0.132  0.002  62.245  [.000]   A1  0.136  0.003  43.832  [.000]
A2 0.922  0.010  95.399  [.000]   A2  0.910  0.015  61.805  [.000]
A3 -0.047  0.008  -5.760  [.000]   A3  -0.003  0.011  -0.237  [.813]
A4 0.155  0.014  11.381  [.000]   A4  0.118  0.020  5.911  [.000]
DSIZE1 -0.059  0.024  -2.487  [.013]   DSIZE1  -0.018  0.036  -0.488  [.625]
DSIZE2 -0.046  0.018  -2.624  [.009]   DSIZE2  0.032  0.028  1.145  [.252]
DSIZE3 -0.046  0.017  -2.739  [.006]   DSIZE3  -0.031  0.025  -1.220  [.223]
AT1  0.192  0.030 6.295 [.000]   AT1  -0.017  0.011 -1.526 [.127]
AT2 -0.020  0.003  -5.907  [.000]   AT2  0.002  0.001  4.364  [.000]
AT3 0.001  0.000  6.527  [.000]   D0  0.063  0.205  0.307  [.759]
D0 -0.544  0.069  -7.832  [.000]   D1  -0.546  0.391  -1.398  [.162]
D1  -0.500 0.229  -2.183  [.029]   D2 -1.504  0.429  -3.504  [.000]
D2  -0.600 0.237  -2.528  [.011]  D3  0.000  0.000  1.412  [.158]
D3 0.000  0.000  3.895  [.000]   DT  0.010  0.009  1.154  [.248]
D5 (enint=1)  0.672  0.052  12.951  [.000]   GAMMA  0.536  0.022  24.101  [.000]
DT 0.014  0.005  2.799  [.005]   S2  0.479  0.030  15.838  [.000]
GAMMA 0.522  0.013  38.821  [.000]   Nobs  7338       
S2 0.401  0.012  33.300  [.000]   Logl  -8123.930      
Nobs  13100          Schwarz BIC   8199.580       
Logl  -13323.000               
Schwarz  BIC  13413.000              
 
Non-energy intensive industry    
Parameter Estimate  Error  t-statistic P-value
A0 5.110  0.124  41.053 [.000] 
A1 0.100  0.003  38.942 [.000] 
A2 1.041  0.011  97.785 [.000] 
A3 0.054  0.012  4.593  [.000] 
A4 0.182  0.015  12.397 [.000] 
DSIZE1 -0.034  0.026  -1.329  [.184] 
DSIZE2 -0.076  0.019  -4.043  [.000] 
DSIZE3 -0.070  0.019  -3.596  [.000] 
AT1 0.168  0.036  4.721  [.000] 
AT2 -0.016  0.004  -3.906  [.000] 
AT3 0.001  0.000  4.290  [.000] 
D0 -0.192  0.092  -2.081  [.037] 
D1 0.454  0.242  1.877  [.061] 
D2 0.290  0.240  1.211  [.226] 
D3 0.000  0.000  -0.014  [.989] 
DT 0.007  0.006  1.106  [.269] 
GAMMA 0.605  0.014  43.966 [.000] 
S2 0.267  0.010  26.556 [.000] 
Nobs 5762       
Logl -4672.180       
Schwarz BIC   4750.110       
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Mining           Food        
Parameter Estimate  Error  t-statisticP-value  Parameter Estimate  Error  t-statisticP-value
A0 8.441  1.650  5.116  [.000]   A0  6.544  0.795  8.226  [.000]
A1 -0.012  0.032  -0.376  [.707]   A1  0.106  0.010  10.850  [.000]
A2 1.014  0.075  13.508 [.000]   A2  0.906  0.054  16.939  [.000]
A3 -0.283  0.093  -3.038  [.002]   A3  -0.118  0.046  -2.585  [.010]
A4 -0.120  0.109  -1.102  [.271]   A4  -0.211  0.073  -2.903  [.004]
DSIZE1 0.717  0.217  3.305  [.001]   DSIZE1  -0.047  0.138  -0.337  [.736]
DSIZE2 0.448  0.151  2.970  [.003]   DSIZE2  -0.057  0.119  -0.478  [.633]
DSIZE3 0.228  0.187  1.219  [.223]   DSIZE3  -0.067  0.106  -0.634  [.526]
AT1 -0.434  0.443  -0.981  [.327]   AT1  0.416  0.155  2.683  [.007]
AT2 0.018  0.042  0.430  [.667]   AT2  -0.055  0.016  -3.342  [.001]
AT3 0.000  0.001  0.059  [.953]   AT3  0.002  0.001  3.561  [.000]
D0 -3.553  0.744  -4.772  [.000]   D0  -1.662  0.587  -2.831  [.005]
D1 0.990  1.972  0.502  [.616]   D1  -0.620  0.469  -1.323  [.186]
D2 4.906  2.213  2.216  [.027]   D2 0.839  0.475  1.764  [.078]
D3 0.005  0.020  0.229  [.819]   D3  -0.062  0.032  -1.967  [.049]
DT 0.328  0.096  3.417  [.001]   DT  0.031  0.046  0.666  [.505]
GAMMA 0.864  0.068  12.778 [.000]   GAMMA  0.864  0.148  5.838  [.000]
S2 0.265  0.056  4.741  [.000]   S2  0.412  0.017  24.041  [.000]
Nobs 141          Nobs  1493       
Logl -53.276          Logl  -1417.420      
Schwarz BIC   97.815          Schwarz BIC 1483.190       
 
 
Textile        Wood        
Parameter Estimate  Error  t-statistic  P-value   Parameter Estimate Error  t-statistic  P-value
A0 5.906  1.230  4.801  [.000]    A0 6.059  0.393  15.416  [.000] 
A1 0.118  0.017  7.150  [.000]    A1 0.092  0.008  11.075  [.000] 
A2 0.443  0.202  2.192  [.028]    A2 0.802  0.034  23.479  [.000] 
A3 0.137  0.084  1.636  [.102]    A3 0.017  0.044  0.391  [.696] 
A4 -0.297  0.115  -2.594  [.009]    A4 0.063  0.057  1.098  [.272] 
DSIZE1 0.594  0.314  1.889  [.059]    DSIZE1 0.581  0.094  6.151  [.000] 
DSIZE2 0.420  0.237  1.775  [.076]    DSIZE2 0.726  0.078  9.293  [.000] 
DSIZE3 0.559  0.175  3.194  [.001]    DSIZE3 0.653  0.083  7.863  [.000] 
AT1 0.792  0.242  3.279  [.001]    AT1 0.250  0.114  2.186  [.029] 
AT2 -0.103  0.028  -3.688  [.000]    AT2 -0.015  0.013  -1.187  [.235] 
AT3 0.004  0.001  3.995  [.000]    AT3 0.000  0.000  0.761  [.447] 
D0 -2.384  0.393  -6.071  [.000]    D0 1.081  0.792  1.365  [.172] 
D1 0.182  1.390  0.131  [.896]    D1 -2.662  1.686  -1.579  [.114] 
D2 3.572  1.473  2.426  [.015]   D2  -1.027  1.741  -0.590  [.555] 
D3 0.684  0.198  3.457  [.001]    D3 0.077  0.108  0.711  [.477] 
DT 0.030  0.019  1.567  [.117]    DT -0.034  0.033  -1.025  [.305] 
GAMMA 0.837  0.081  10.347  [.000]    GAMMA 0.954  0.011  86.705  [.000] 
S2 0.254  0.031  8.123  [.000]    S2 1.372  0.363  3.780  [.000] 
Nobs 277          Nobs  1298       
Logl -152.586         Logl  -1137.040    
Schwarz BIC 203.203          Schwarz BIC1201.560      
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Pulp/paper         Printing    
Parameter Estimate  Error  t-statistic P-value Parameter Estimate  Error  t-statistic P-value
A0 9.827  1.516  6.483  [.000]  A0 6.202  0.664  9.340  [.000] 
A1 0.102  0.012  8.380  [.000]  A1 0.107  0.011  9.564  [.000] 
A2 0.880  0.036  24.635  [.000]  A2 0.862  0.041  20.995  [.000] 
A3 -0.100  0.026  -3.832  [.000]  A3 -0.223  0.069  -3.244  [.001] 
A4 -0.288  0.054  -5.371  [.000]  A4 -0.165  0.067  -2.451  [.014] 
DSIZE1 -0.250  0.077  -3.263  [.001]  DSIZE1 -0.190  0.133  -1.433  [.152] 
DSIZE2 -0.160  0.053  -3.001  [.003]  DSIZE2 -0.126  0.119  -1.060  [.289] 
DSIZE3 -0.198  0.045  -4.384  [.000]  DSIZE3 -0.116  0.144  -0.806  [.420] 
AT1 -0.555  0.473  -1.174  [.240]  AT1 -0.088  0.177  -0.493  [.622] 
AT2 0.009  0.044  0.213  [.831]  AT2  -0.005  0.018  -0.262  [.793] 
AT3 0.001  0.001  0.606  [.544]  AT3 0.000  0.001  0.785  [.432] 
D0 -3.208  0.636  -5.046  [.000]  D0 -1.296  0.352  -3.683  [.000] 
D1 -1.520  0.654  -2.325  [.020]  D1 -1.321  1.091  -1.211  [.226] 
D2 -0.173  0.709  -0.243  [.808]  D2 2.080  1.068  1.947  [.051] 
D3 -0.013  0.008  -1.591  [.112]  D3 -0.022  0.047  -0.476  [.634] 
DT 0.360  0.100  3.616  [.000]  DT 0.114  0.039  2.898  [.004] 
GAMMA 0.561  0.063  8.933  [.000]    GAMMA 0.551  0.094  5.844  [.000] 
S2 0.177  0.017  10.362  [.000]  S2 0.249  0.029  8.512  [.000] 
Nobs 949          Nobs 637       
Logl -349.692          Logl -367.162       
Schwarz BIC  406.391          Schwarz BIC  425.273       
 
Chemical        Rubber/plastic     
Parameter Estimate  Error  t-statistic  P-value   Parameter  Estimate Error  t-statistic  P-value
A0 11.308  2.987  3.786  [.000]    A0 5.405  0.384  14.077  [.000] 
A1 0.174  0.022  7.845  [.000]    A1  0.087  0.008  10.350  [.000] 
A2 0.887  0.064  13.843  [.000]    A2  1.002  0.046  21.571  [.000] 
A3 -0.131  0.039  -3.314  [.001]    A3 0.032  0.036  0.885  [.376] 
A4 0.147  0.088  1.676  [.094]    A4  0.014  0.054  0.265  [.791] 
DSIZE1 0.258  0.174  1.484  [.138]    DSIZE1  -0.046  0.093  -0.491  [.624] 
DSIZE2 0.242  0.126  1.925  [.054]    DSIZE2  -0.126  0.074  -1.709  [.088] 
DSIZE3 0.352  0.129  2.726  [.006]    DSIZE3  -0.041  0.055  -0.748  [.454] 
AT1 -1.051  0.893  -1.177  [.239]    AT1 0.100  0.100  0.997  [.319] 
AT2 0.043  0.087  0.496  [.620]    AT2  -0.012  0.011  -1.108  [.268] 
AT3 0.000  0.003  0.037  [.971]    AT3  0.001  0.000  1.423  [.155] 
D0 -4.926  1.457  -3.381  [.001]    D0 0.019  0.839  0.023  [.982] 
D1 -0.632  0.980  -0.645  [.519]    D1  -0.108  0.809  -0.134  [.893] 
D2 -1.302  1.092  -1.192  [.233]    D2  -0.953  1.876  -0.508  [.612] 
D3 0.121  0.036  3.342  [.001]    D3  -0.031  0.059  -0.522  [.602] 
DT 0.569  0.221  2.577  [.010]    DT  0.018  0.033  0.531  [.595] 
GAMMA 0.339  0.131  2.596  [.009]    GAMMA  0.492  0.232  2.124  [.034] 
S2 0.651  0.107  6.103  [.000]    S2  0.182  0.107  1.696  [.090] 
Nobs  689         Nobs  644     
Logl -749.928         Logl  -398.036    
Schwarz BIC  808.746          Schwarz BIC 456.245      
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Mineral/stone      Steel/iron        
Parameter Estimate  Error  t-statistic  P-value   Parameter Estimate  Error  t-statistic  P-value
A0  10.092 1.779 5.672 [.000]    A0  7.405  1.612 4.595 [.000] 
A1 0.121  0.013  9.094  [.000]    A1 0.119  0.009  12.841  [.000] 
A2  0.794  0.037 21.584 [.000]    A2  0.907  0.043 21.272 [.000] 
A3 -0.033  0.026  -1.280  [.201]    A3 -0.327  0.027  -12.235  [.000] 
A4  -0.063 0.048 -1.295 [.195]    A4  -0.293  0.063 -4.647 [.000] 
DSIZE1  -0.139 0.091 -1.532 [.126]    DSIZE1  -0.271  0.100 -2.721 [.006] 
DSIZE2  -0.168 0.072 -2.345 [.019]    DSIZE2  -0.182  0.071 -2.560 [.010] 
DSIZE3  -0.212 0.065 -3.255 [.001]    DSIZE3  -0.129  0.068 -1.882 [.060] 
AT1  -0.902 0.446 -2.021 [.043]    AT1  -0.762  0.427 -1.785 [.074] 
AT2  0.057 0.038 1.506 [.132]    AT2  0.069  0.038 1.816 [.069] 
AT3  -0.001 0.001 -0.857 [.391]    AT3  -0.002  0.001 -1.674 [.094] 
D0  -2.934 0.958 -3.062 [.002]    D0  -1.110  0.928 -1.197 [.231] 
D1 0.850  1.836  0.463  [.643]    D1 -2.541  0.912  -2.788  [.005] 
D2 -3.668  1.933  -1.897  [.058]    D2 2.265  0.878  2.579  [.010] 
D3  -0.017 0.034 -0.514 [.607]    D3  -0.014  0.009 -1.491 [.136] 
DT  0.434 0.111 3.915 [.000]    DT  0.173  0.129 1.341 [.180] 
GAMMA  0.480 0.078 6.144 [.000]    GAMMA  0.002  0.021 0.099 [.921] 
S2 0.278  0.029  9.648  [.000]    S2 0.396  0.012  32.443  [.000] 
Nobs  744       Nobs  2030     
Logl  -442.891       Logl -1939.920    
Schwarz BIC   502.755          Schwarz BIC 2008.460      
 
Machine/electro       Motor vehicles     
Parameter Estimate  Error  t-statistic  P-value   Parameter  Estimate Error  t-statistic  P-value
A0 4.877  0.170  28.639  [.000]    A0  5.088  0.274  18.539  [.000] 
A1 0.092  0.004  23.580  [.000]    A1  0.074  0.006  12.301  [.000] 
A2 1.077  0.016  68.624  [.000]    A2  1.004  0.022  45.718  [.000] 
A3 -0.116  0.012  9.849  [.000]    A3 0.069  0.030  2.301  [.021] 
A4 -0.144  0.021  6.981  [.000]    A4 0.057  0.035  1.600  [.110] 
DSIZE1 0.028  0.040  0.706  [.480]    DSIZE1  -0.340  0.051  -6.708  [.000] 
DSIZE2 0.055  0.027  2.038  [.042]    DSIZE2  -0.411  0.039  -10.548  [.000] 
DSIZE3 0.001  0.027  0.043  [.965]    DSIZE3  -0.403  0.049  -8.239  [.000] 
AT1 0.225  0.051  4.407  [.000]    AT1  0.442  0.081  5.436  [.000] 
AT2  -0.023 0.006 -3.957 [.000]    AT2  -0.046  0.009  -4.956  [.000] 
AT3 0.001  0.000  4.430  [.000]    AT3  0.002  0.000  4.912  [.000] 
D0  -0.069 0.130 -0.531 [.595]    D0  -0.088  0.174  -0.505  [.614] 
D1 0.487  0.344  1.416  [.157]    D1 1.520  0.422  3.601  [.000] 
D2  -0.640 0.378 -1.693 [.090]    D2 -2.362  0.478  -4.937  [.000] 
D3  -0.011 0.005 -2.125 [.034]    D3  0.001  0.003  0.407  [.684] 
DT 0.005  0.008  0.665  [.506]    DT  0.011  0.012  0.950  [.342] 
GAMMA 0.656  0.018  36.306  [.000]    GAMMA  0.702  0.026  26.593  [.000] 
S2 0.263  0.013  19.915  [.000]    S2  0.215  0.018  12.121  [.000] 
Nobs 2552         Nobs  1048       
Logl -2100.930        Logl -775.229      
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Table A2. Results with K and L in inefficiency equation 
 
Manufacturing         Energy intensive industry    
Parameter Estimate  Error  t-statistic  P-value   Parameter Estimate  Error  t-statistic  P-value
A0 12.695  0.114  111.414  [.000]    A0  12.692  0.218  58.118  [.000] 
A1 -0.084  0.010  -8.621  [.000]    A1  -0.027  0.018  -1.530  [.126] 
A2 0.028  0.016  1.715  [.086]    A2  -0.009  0.028  -0.326  [.744] 
DSIZE1 -2.531  0.023  -109.516  [.000]    DSIZE1 1.760  0.140  12.573  [.000] 
DSIZE2 -1.598  0.022  -74.335  [.000]    DSIZE2 1.748  0.109  16.084  [.000] 
DSIZE3 -1.024  0.022  -46.686  [.000]    DSIZE3 0.916  0.077  11.821  [.000] 
AT1 0.273  0.037  7.323  [.000]    AT1  0.291  0.073  3.966  [.000] 
AT2 -0.027  0.004  -6.315  [.000]    AT2  -0.034  0.008  -4.080  [.000] 
AT3 0.001  0.000  6.389  [.000]    AT3  0.001  0.000  4.372  [.000] 
D0 -0.611  0.081  -7.517  [.000]    D0  -5.294  0.180  -29.487  [.000] 
D1 -0.707  0.247  -2.856  [.004]    D1 -0.677  0.221  -3.063  [.002] 
D2 -0.370  0.252  -1.466  [.143]    D2 -0.960  0.234  -4.110  [.000] 
D3 0.000  0.000  3.656  [.000]    D3  0.012  0.001  23.134  [.000] 
D4 0.000  0.000  2.556  [.011]    D4  0.000  0.000  12.027  [.000] 
D5 (enint=1)  0.678  0.047  14.529  [.000]    DT  0.010  0.009  1.140  [.254] 
DT 0.003  0.005  0.637  [.524]    GAMMA  0.228  0.051  4.436  [.000] 
GAMMA 0.575  0.012  47.522  [.000]    S2  0.562  0.011  50.226  [.000] 
S2 0.616  0.019  32.294  [.000]    Nobs  7406       
Nobs 13217          Logl  -8232.550      
Logl -16420.900        Schwarz  BIC  8308.290      
Schwarz BIC   16506.300                   
 
Non-energy intensive industry    
Parameter Estimate  Error  t-statistic  P-value 
A0 13.336  0.278  48.040  [.000] 
A1 0.061  0.023  2.677  [.007] 
A2 0.166  0.030  5.602  [.000] 
DSIZE1 -0.105  0.112  -0.932  [.351] 
DSIZE2 0.423  0.090  4.693  [.000] 
DSIZE3 0.495  0.064  7.750  [.000] 
AT1 0.260  0.070  3.742  [.000] 
AT2 -0.019  0.008  -2.489  [.013] 
AT3 0.001  0.000  2.317  [.021] 
D0 -3.902  0.215  -18.178  [.000] 
D1 0.341  0.207  1.650  [.099] 
D2 0.094  0.206  0.455  [.649] 
D3 0.005  0.000  16.399  [.000] 
D4 0.000  0.000  9.116  [.000] 
DT -0.036  0.021  -1.752  [.080] 
GAMMA 0.021  0.003  6.283  [.000] 
S2 0.362  0.009  38.265  [.000] 
Nobs 5811       
Logl -5287.000       
Schwarz BIC   5360.680       
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Mining           Food        
Parameter Estimate  Error  t-statistic  P-value   Parameter Estimate Error  t-statistic  P-value
A0 9.028  1.168  7.729  [.000]    A0 11.766  0.391  30.091  [.000] 
A1 -0.997  0.135  -7.391  [.000]    A1 -0.160  0.044  -3.625  [.000] 
A2 -0.701  0.138  -5.081  [.000]    A2 -0.220  0.070  -3.160  [.002] 
DSIZE1 -2.105  0.265  -7.950  [.000]    DSIZE1 -0.821  0.093  -8.812  [.000] 
DSIZE2 -0.811  0.251  -3.231  [.001]    DSIZE2 -0.755  0.058  -13.058  [.000] 
DSIZE3 -0.444  0.234  -1.896  [.058]    DSIZE3 -0.512  0.052  -9.894  [.000] 
AT1 0.319  0.369  0.864  [.388]    AT1 0.354  0.139  2.546  [.011] 
AT2 -0.028  0.041  -0.684  [.494]    AT2 -0.044  0.016  -2.714  [.007] 
AT3 0.001  0.001  0.627  [.531]    AT3 0.002  0.001  2.945  [.003] 
D0 -0.101  1.156  -0.088  [.930]    D0 -2.410  0.188  -12.830  [.000] 
D1 0.768  2.099  0.366  [.714]    D1 -0.457  0.891  -0.513  [.608] 
D2 -2.666  3.985  -0.669  [.504]    D2  1.062  0.964  1.101  [.271] 
D3 0.001  0.002  0.331  [.740]    D3 0.014  0.001  12.701  [.000] 
D4 0.000  0.000  0.061  [.951]    D4 0.000  0.000  5.327  [.000] 
DT -0.010  0.067  -0.146  [.884]    DT -0.016  0.014  -1.086  [.277] 
GAMMA 0.590  0.166  3.550  [.000]    GAMMA 0.594  0.046  13.014  [.000] 
S2 0.335  0.187  1.787  [.074]    S2 0.652  0.047  13.942  [.000] 
Nobs  141       Nobs  1503     
Logl  -132.183       Logl -1443.300   
Schwarz BIC  174.247          Schwarz BIC  1505.48       
 
Textile       Wood        
Parameter Estimate  Error  t-statistic  P-value   Parameter Estimate Error  t-statistic  P-value
A0  10.124 0.623 16.262 [.000]    A0  11.234 0.428 26.249 [.000] 
A1  0.155 0.050 3.107 [.002]    A1  0.030 0.051 0.593 [.553] 
A2 -0.227  0.118  -1.927  [.054]    A2  0.010  0.048  0.218  [.828] 
DSIZE1 0.324  0.168  1.922  [.055]    DSIZE1 -0.669  0.106  -6.284  [.000] 
DSIZE2 0.270  0.119  2.261  [.024]    DSIZE2 -0.310  0.106  -2.925  [.003] 
DSIZE3 0.269  0.090  3.004  [.003]    DSIZE3 -0.219  0.125  -1.745  [.081] 
AT1  0.766 0.205 3.745 [.000]    AT1  0.455 0.140 3.243 [.001] 
AT2  -0.094 0.024 -3.869 [.000]    AT2  -0.043 0.016 -2.715 [.007] 
AT3  0.004 0.001 4.134 [.000]    AT3  0.001 0.001 2.484 [.013] 
D0  -3.055  0.227 -13.466 [.000]    D0  -2.452  0.238 -10.298 [.000] 
D1 -0.056  0.793  -0.070  [.944]    D1 -1.798  0.867  -2.072  [.038] 
D2 3.634  0.834  4.358  [.000]   D2  -0.750  0.886  -0.846  [.398] 
D3  0.007 0.001 7.339 [.000]    D3  0.016 0.003 6.093 [.000] 
D4  0.000 0.000 8.224 [.000]    D4  0.000 0.000 5.234 [.000] 
DT -0.031  0.018  -1.713  [.087]    DT  0.025  0.017  1.442  [.149] 
GAMMA 0.836  0.054  15.564  [.000]    GAMMA 0.654  0.074  8.878  [.000] 
S2  0.192 0.024 8.030 [.000]    S2  0.648 0.100 6.452 [.000] 
Nobs  277      Nobs  1301     
Logl  -131.488      Logl  -1190.330   
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Pulp/paper        Printing        
Parameter Estimate  Error  t-statistic  P-value   Parameter Estimate Error  t-statistic  P-value
A0 13.071  0.256  51.120  [.000]    A0 11.391  0.439  25.937  [.000] 
A1 -0.072  0.024  -2.961  [.003]    A1 -0.134  0.051  -2.618  [.009] 
A2 -0.279  0.047  -5.937  [.000]    A2 -0.254  0.074  -3.411  [.001] 
DSIZE1 -0.390  0.133  -2.944  [.003]    DSIZE1 -1.629  0.123  -13.203  [.000] 
DSIZE2 0.230  0.108  2.124  [.034]    DSIZE2 -1.181  0.111  -10.658  [.000] 
DSIZE3 0.313  0.097  3.220  [.001]    DSIZE3 -0.674  0.120  -5.622  [.000] 
AT1 0.154  0.087  1.775  [.076]    AT1 0.062  0.158  0.393  [.694] 
AT2 -0.021  0.010  -2.098  [.036]    AT2 -0.011  0.018  -0.613  [.540] 
AT3 0.001  0.000  2.539  [.011]    AT3 0.001  0.001  0.915  [.360] 
D0 -2.930  0.157  -18.624  [.000]    D0 -2.211  0.220  -10.054  [.000] 
D1 -0.757  0.370  -2.045  [.041]   D1  0.863  0.922  0.936  [.349] 
D2 -0.938  0.396  -2.368  [.018]   D2  1.339  0.995  1.346  [.178] 
D3 0.004  0.000  15.371  [.000]    D3 0.022  0.004  6.123  [.000] 
D4 0.000  0.000  7.285  [.000]    D4 0.000  0.000  3.850  [.000] 
DT 0.005  0.007  0.651  [.515]    DT -0.018  0.019  -0.940  [.347] 
GAMMA 0.863  0.021  41.291  [.000]    GAMMA 0.498  0.080  6.211  [.000] 
S2 0.199  0.010  20.932  [.000]    S2 0.353  0.048  7.380  [.000] 
Nobs  951      Nobs  639     
Logl -423.837      Logl -431.083    
Schwarz  BIC  482.125      Schwarz  BIC  485.992     
 
Chemical       Rubber/plastic     
Parameter Estimate  Error  t-statistic  P-value   Parameter Estimate Error  t-statistic  P-value
A0  12.010 0.688 17.468 [.000]    A0  12.271 0.333 36.863 [.000] 
A1 -0.106  0.034  -3.089  [.002]    A1 0.172  0.037  4.585  [.000] 
A2 0.081  0.087  0.932  [.351]    A2  -0.043  0.059  -0.724  [.469] 
DSIZE1 -1.461  0.211  -6.919  [.000]    DSIZE1 -1.929  0.068  -28.523  [.000] 
DSIZE2 -0.894  0.131  -6.841  [.000]    DSIZE2 -1.226  0.060  -20.363  [.000] 
DSIZE3  -0.605 0.123 -4.905 [.000]    DSIZE3  -0.498 0.055 -8.977 [.000] 
AT1  0.548 0.232 2.358 [.018]    AT1  0.201 0.116 1.734 [.083] 
AT2  -0.065 0.026 -2.496 [.013]    AT2  -0.016 0.013 -1.244 [.213] 
AT3  0.002 0.001 2.702 [.007]    AT3  0.000 0.000 1.070 [.285] 
D0  -1.901 0.324 -5.874 [.000]    D0  -0.308 0.243 -1.267 [.205] 
D1  1.082 0.739 1.463 [.143]    D1  0.869 0.671 1.297 [.195] 
D2 2.145  0.910  2.358  [.018]    D2 -2.511  0.873  -2.876  [.004] 
D3  0.002 0.001 1.448 [.148]    D3  0.002 0.001 2.965 [.003] 
D4  0.000 0.000 2.692 [.007]    D4  0.000 0.000 0.648 [.517] 
DT -0.025  0.026  -0.926  [.354]    DT 0.000  0.016  0.018  [.986] 
GAMMA 0.481  0.134  3.580  [.000]    GAMMA 0.657  0.055  12.038  [.000] 
S2  0.568 0.085 6.676 [.000]    S2  0.306 0.040 7.589 [.000] 
Nobs  620      Nobs  642     
Logl  -636.122      Logl  -600.380   
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Mineral/stone      Steel/iron       
Parameter Estimate  Error  t-statistic  P-value   Parameter Estimate Error  t-statistic  P-value
A0  11.313 0.424 26.661 [.000]    A0  12.650  0.358 35.385 [.000] 
A1 0.001  0.035  0.036  [.971]    A1  -0.433  0.043  -10.142  [.000] 
A2  -0.161 0.057 -2.822 [.005]    A2  -0.253  0.064 -3.958 [.000] 
DSIZE1 -0.960  0.174  -5.509  [.000]    DSIZE1  1.336  0.205  6.520  [.000] 
DSIZE2 -1.026  0.148  -6.934  [.000]    DSIZE2  1.354  0.155  8.719  [.000] 
DSIZE3 -0.716  0.072  -9.991  [.000]    DSIZE3  0.757  0.111  6.845  [.000] 
AT1 0.243  0.157  1.552  [.121]    AT1  -0.191  0.125  -1.531  [.126] 
AT2 -0.030  0.018  -1.741  [.082]    AT2  0.020  0.014  1.471  [.141] 
AT3 0.001  0.001  2.108  [.035]    AT3  -0.001  0.000  -1.105  [.269] 
D0  -2.340 0.158 -14.818 [.000]    D0  -4.657  0.272 -17.138 [.000] 
D1 1.555  0.515  3.021  [.003]    D1 -1.558  0.463  -3.362  [.001] 
D2 -0.923  0.560  -1.648  [.099]   D2  0.321  0.473  0.679  [.497] 
D3 0.015  0.002  6.254  [.000]    D3  0.010  0.001  15.831  [.000] 
D4 0.000  0.000  4.124  [.000]    D4  0.000  0.000  14.690  [.000] 
DT  -0.010 0.014 -0.753 [.452]    DT  -0.005  0.011 -0.427 [.669] 
GAMMA 0.359  0.180  1.992  [.046]    GAMMA  0.000 0.022  0.022  [.983] 
S2 0.255  0.034  7.526  [.000]    S2  0.412  0.009  44.925  [.000] 
Nobs  787      Nobs  2038     
Logl  -493.588    Logl -1987.980   
Schwarz  BIC  550.268      Schwarz  BIC  2052.750    
 
Machine/electro      Motor vehicles     
Parameter Estimate  Error  t-statistic  P-value   Parameter Estimate Error  t-statistic  P-value
A0 12.479  0.219  56.962  [.000]    A0  12.473 0.465  26.824  [.000] 
A1 0.104  0.020  5.214  [.000]    A1  -0.073  0.038  -1.933  [.053] 
A2  0.175 0.029 6.092 [.000]    A2  0.133 0.062 2.132 [.033] 
DSIZE1 -2.605  0.053  -48.772  [.000]    DSIZE1  -3.405  0.097  -35.164  [.000] 
DSIZE2 -1.606  0.043  -37.575  [.000]    DSIZE2  -2.680  0.096  -27.811  [.000] 
DSIZE3 -1.046  0.042  -25.184  [.000]    DSIZE3  -1.978  0.122  -16.249  [.000] 
AT1  0.375 0.070 5.335 [.000]    AT1  0.542 0.137 3.964 [.000] 
AT2 -0.034  0.008  -4.297  [.000]    AT2  -0.050  0.015  -3.213  [.001] 
AT3  0.001 0.000 4.099 [.000]    AT3  0.002 0.001 2.919 [.004] 
D0 -0.164  0.176  -0.929  [.353]    D0  -0.073  0.538  -0.135  [.892] 
D1 -0.377  0.444  -0.848  [.396]    D1 1.696  0.881  1.924  [.054] 
D2 -0.009  0.464  -0.020  [.984]    D2 -2.156  1.187  -1.816  [.069] 
D3  0.000 0.000 1.481 [.139]    D3  0.000 0.000 0.596 [.551] 
D4 0.000  0.000  0.902  [.367]    D4  0.000  0.000  -0.005  [.996] 
DT -0.002  0.011  -0.165  [.869]    DT  -0.006  0.020  -0.299  [.765] 
GAMMA 0.623  0.022  28.910  [.000]    GAMMA  0.536  0.069  7.769  [.000] 
S2 0.440  0.027  16.377  [.000]    S2  0.468  0.088  5.291  [.000] 
Nobs  2554      Nobs  821     
Logl  -2744.760    Logl  -913.157   
Schwarz  BIC  2811.450      Schwarz  BIC  970.197   
 
 
 
 
 